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Abstract
Do differently oriented political parties implement radically divergent policies which
impact the citizenss welfare? The overheated political debate notwithstanding, it is far
from clear if this is really the case. Whereas current literature on this issue narrows the
focus on specific policy outcomes and instruments, we use the real estate market to eval-
uate the impact of the whole spectrum of municipal policies. Using a novel dataset on
Italian municipal elections for the years 2003-2011 and the corresponding changes in real
estate market prices, we employ a regression discontinuity approach to detect the causal
effect of a change in municipal majorities. We find robust evidence of no difference between
the effects of the policies enacted by left-wing and right-wing parties after three, four, and five
years since the election. Finally, we are able to detect an average increase of 4.2% in the
price of peripheral housing in areas ruled by left-wing municipalities.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Do differently oriented political parties implement radically divergent policies which impact
the citizens’ welfare? The overheated political debate notwithstanding, it is far from clear if
this is really the case. According to the standard theory of median voter (Downs, 1957), when
citizens’ preferences are unimodal, rational politicians find profitable to move their political
platforms towards the center of the political spectrum: over time, this results in increasing
similarities between political platforms and negligible differences between implemented poli-
cies.
One implication of the median voter theory is that, in two-parties or bipolar political
systems, left-wing and right-wing parties would tend to be increasingly similar: to test such
implication is the aim of the present work. As testing the theory at the national level can be
confounded by a formidable number of variables, we approach the problem at the municipal
level and test whether left-wing and right-wing parties differ substantially in their contribution
to the welfare of their cities.
1.2 Why current literature is faulty
The current literature on the effects of local partisanship deploys a set of variables which rep-
resent the outcome of a given majority upon either some final economic variable or on some
intermediate variables that are supposed to influence the final outcome of interest (Gerber and
Hopkins, 2011; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). While this method-
ology, if correctly applied in a quasi-experimental design, can deliver credible estimates of the
size of the causal effect of a given majority on the outcome of interest, nonetheless it does
not capture the net effect of the whole bundle of benefits and costs as originated by a local
municipality.
Municipalities provide a mix of local public and private goods and bads which impact on
the welfare of their citizens. Some municipalities can succeed on some margins, while others
can fall short on different margins. To fully assess the value of the net benefits provided by
a municipality would require a complete set of observations on every aspect of life affected
by the municipality. This would not be only impractical, but also impossible to obtain since
many relevant variables are nondimensional by nature – the value of an embellished square or
the deteriorated air quality being natural examples.
1.3 Our solution – Using the housing market
An indirect pathway can be taken to estimate the effect of the bundle of costs and benefits orig-
inated by a given municipality and it is based on the peculiar features of the housing market.
Since, at least in the medium run, the supply of housing can be safely considered rigid, this
is a factor of production which tends to accrue the net value of geographically concentrated
benefits, including those generated by municipalities.
Suppose that, in a given geographical area exist two separate cities, namely Shelbyville and
Springfield. At t = 0 all citizens have the same level of utility, irrespective of which city they
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live in.1 At t = 1 the municipality of Shelbyville passes a budget plan which develops the
green spaces and enhances air quality, resulting in an improved quality of life. The Simpsons,
a family currently living in Springfield, start pondering whether to relocate to Shelbyville. If
they moved there, they would surely increase their utility. Nonetheless, as the information
on the benefits of living in Shelbyville start spreading to the citizens living in Springfield, the
housing prices in Shelbyville will increase (and those in Springfield will decrease) up to the
point to offsetting the gain to relocating to Shelbyville. The Simpsons, in the end, would find
that there is no point in leaving their hometown after all equilibrium adjustments have taken
place. When rational agents correctly foresee the final outcome of migrations between the
two cities, housing prices will adjust in anticipation of future costs and benefits even before
actual relocation takes place, with the prices in Shelbyville moving upward and the prices in
Springfield moving downward.
In general, while municipalities are relatively free to choose their preferred mix of costs
and benefits to reflect the preferences of their citizens, the housing market adjusts accordingly
to reflect the value of the available amenities. As municipalities modify the net value of their
services, ceteris paribus, housing prices change as well. As general microeconomic theory
predicts, in the long run, all economic gains are reaped by the owners of the factors in fixed
supply. This mechanism is driven by the spatial mobility of economic agents (Tiebout, 1956).
In a frictionless world in which all markets adjust to the new equilibrium, relocating to a new
place is just a matter of indifference for the marginal citizen.
1.4 Implications of the theory
The application of general equilibrium theory to the case of the production of local goods by
a municipality leads to two main predictions:
1. In the short run, housing prices tend to adjust in the same direction of the change in the
net value of the goods provided by the municipality: some losers and some winners, but
effects are not required to cancel out in the aggregate.
2. In the long run, the owners of nonreproducible factors are the only ones to gain from
an increased value of locally-provided benefits: the effects of the municipal policies are
purely distributive in nature.
These two statements are observationally equivalent: they both imply that housing prices
move upward (downward) in those cities whose municipalities provide a bundle of net benefits
(costs). Establishing this causal link from municipal policies to housing prices is our crucial
theoretical step. We apply this framework to identify the difference between the effects of
public policies enacted by left-wing and right-wing majorities on housing prices, using Italian
municipal data.
1.5 Why using the RD design
Given that, in general, left-wing parties promise more income redistribution and redistribu-
tion is easier to attain the higher the level of the local income, it turns out that housing prices
1We due the inspiration for this example to Landsburg (2012).
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(positively related to local income) and the presence of a left-wing municipality display a posi-
tive association. The sign of this correlation, nonetheless, could be misleading since it does not
reflect any genuine causation going from municipality’s political color to housing prices, but
just a spurious association that would disappear as a complete set of controls were included in
a regression model.
The Italian local electoral system provides an opportunity to test the theory of the me-
dian voter. In 1993, the Italian National Parliament passed a law which regulates municipal
elections according to a majority principle. Cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants have a
top-two runoff voting system: if there is no absolute majority at the first round, then a ballot
election is held between the two highest voting mayor candidates. Cities with less than 15,000
inhabitants have a single-winner voting system, with the highest voting mayor candidate be-
ing elected. In both systems, either the party or the coalition backing up the winning mayor
candidate obtains a sufficient number of seats in the Municipal Council to become majority.
The mayor and the corresponding Municipal Council remain in charge for five years. In sum,
this is winning-party-takes-all system.
This electoral law can be seen as a natural experiment in the electoral districts in which the
majority at the second – and also at the first – turn is formed without a large margin. These
districts can be seen as experiencing a sort of random assignment to a policy which is almost
orthogonal to the prevailing political preferences. Since minor differences in political prefer-
ences may result in large differences in the type of policies implemented, this becomes an op-
portunity to employ a sharp Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) (Imbens and Lemieux,
2008) to evaluate the causal effect of political parties on real estate prices at 3, 4, and 5 years
after the election.
1.6 Data
Our dataset contains a collection of municipal election results linked to real estate prices for
the years 2003–2011, for a total of 1,246 observations in which left-wing and right-wing party
confront in a given municipal election. We are able to observe average annual growth rates of
real estate prices after three, four, and five years from the election. Furthermore, our data is de-
tailed enough to distinguish between residential or commercial usage and central or peripheral
location.
1.7 Results
In the empirical section, we implement two different estimators: (1) a local linear estimator
with three alternative bandwidths, and (2) a penalized regression spline estimator. The key
finding is striking: we find no evidence of a difference in housing price dynamics in cities ruled
by left-wing and right-wing majorities. The results are extremely robust when checked across
different types of land use and support the thesis that political partisanship, at the local level,
is not able to impact the overall level of citizen’s welfare, as measured by real estate price
dynamics. Finally, we perform a meta-analysis on our results to provide evidence of no bias
in results reporting and to check for study-level effects: we aggregate the estimated impact
coefficients and find a moderate effect of left-wing majorities on the growth rate of real estate
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prices in peripheral locations. According to our estimates, in a five-year legislature, peripheral
locations can expect to register a rise of real estate prices of 4.2%.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the current literature on the effect of
mayor partisanship, with a special focus on RDD methods. Section 3 presents a theoretical
model for assessing our priors about the effect of different political majorities on real estate
prices. Section 5 provides the necessary econometric background for our estimates. Section 4
describes the dataset used in the estimation. Section 6 discusses the estimation results and elab-
orates on alternative explanations. Section 7 concludes and provides lines of future research.
2 Survey of the current literature
Since the seminal work of Lee (2001), economists have been increasingly attracted by the po-
tential of regression discontinuity estimators for the study of political partisanship. A number
of articles, in recent years, has dealt with the issue of estimating the difference in intermediate
and outcome variables linked to alternative local political majorities.
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) estimate the impact of a democratic mayor on policy out-
comes at the municipal level using a sample of nearly 2,000 direct mayoral elections in over
400 U.S. cities in the period 1950–2000. They focus on budgetary variables (total revenues
per capita, total taxes per capita, total expenditures per capita, total employment per capita),
allocation of resources (percent spent on salaries and wages, police and fire department, parks
and recreation), and crime indexes (murders, robberies, burglaries, larcenies). Using a RD esti-
mator, they are able to show no evidence of systematic differences between Conservative and
Democratic mayorships. These results seem consistent with Alesina (1988)’s claims that cities
should be more homogeneous in their political preferences than higher levels of government
and that municipal competition may lead to decreased partisanship as the costs of switching
to another municipality is relatively low. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) also claim that the
small numbers of media available at the municipal level lowers the incentive to target specific
populations and fostering partisanships, though this could be less than true in large cities.
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009)’s results are problematic since they control for median house
value. This amounts to considering the log of house value as a predetermined feature of a
given municipal district, quite hard an assumption to maintain as household values tend to
reflect the value of local amenities and the capitalized value of local goods provided by the
public sector.2 Actually, the value of housing can well be an outcome variable determined by
the political treatment: according to econometric theory (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), these
variables cannot validly qualify as genuine exogenous controls.
Gerber and Hopkins (2011) hypothesize that mayoral partisanship will more strongly af-
fect policy outcomes in policy areas where there is less shared authority between local, state,
and federal government. Political science literature assumes that the two major parties have
distinct electoral coalitions and governing philosophies that should lead to quite different pol-
icy outcomes, especially on issues of taxing and spending. On one hand, left-wing parties
might pursue increased taxes and expanded services, and right-wing might pursue tax cuts and
2For a systematic survey on the issue of the provision of local public goods and housing prices, see Wildasin
(1987).
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service reductions. On the other hand, if the various constraints on local policymakers are
binding, the impact of mayoral partisanship might prove negligible. Mayor’s partisanship is
an important determinant of fiscal outcomes in some policy areas where local decision makers
are less constrained by other levels of the U.S. federal system. Using an RD quasi-experimental
design with a sample of U.S. mayoral election in large cities from 1990 to 2006, Gerber and
Hopkins (2011) find evidence that the difference between Conservative and Liberal municipal-
ities is negligible in areas where federal and state actors exert more authority. In somewhat the
same fashion, Leigh (2008) uses a panel data of U.S. states over the period 1941–2002 and finds
that the differences between Democratic and Conservative governors are almost negligible.
Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) estimates the causal effect of party control on fiscal and eco-
nomic policies employing a dataset of Swedish municipalities. Using panel data plus RD de-
sign, the author uses 5,913 observations for the period 1974–1994 and finds differences between
parties: Left-wing local governments spend and tax 2-3% more than right-wing counterparts.
Left-wing governments also have 7% lower unemployment rates due a higher level of employ-
ment in public sector.
Some applied work suggests that ideological differences may drive systematic differences
in enacted policies. For example, Picazo-Tadeo, González-Gómez, Wanden-Berghe, and Ruiz-
Villaverde (2011) find that ideological differences between parties at the municipal level lead to
different water management regimes in Andalusia, Spain, with right-wing majorities leading
to more outsourcing. Also, Blom-Hansen, Monkerud, and Sørensen (2006) detect a financially
significant difference between left-wing and right-wing municipalities in Denmark and Nor-
way with regard to tax policy: according to their data, left-wing municipalities, especially in
Denmark, appear to levy higher income and property taxes. Nonetheless, these works do not
control for endogenous sorting and preexisting political preferences, so their results must be
taken with a grain of salt.
In a related stream of literature, Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) have recently em-
ployed a RD design for estimating the value of school facility investments via real estate mar-
kets, on the assumption that school districts create value which translates into higher housing
prices according to a Samuelson-like rule of optimal allocation of public goods. They provide
a theoretical analysis based on previous literature (Barrow and Rouse, 2004; Brueckner, 1979;
Tiebout, 1956) in which the intensity of preference for spending in school infrastructure is re-
vealed by changes in housing prices; empirically, with the help of a dynamic RD design, they
convincingly manage the issue of endogenous Tiebout sorting across school districts.
In sum, the best available evidence to date suggests that differences in the political com-
position of municipalities have a small or negligible effect on some given margins of citizens’
welfare. However, a definitive complete test of the whole bunch of benefits and costs origi-
nated by municipalities is still lacking. This is precisely the point we intend to investigate in
the next sections with our RD design.
7
3 A theoretical model of left-wing/right-wing choice
4 Data
4.1 Sources
Our dataset is obtained by merging observations from three sources.
Prices This is a dataset on real estate prices released by the Agenzia del Territorio (the Italian
public agency of territory). The prices are collected on a twice-a-year basis from various
market sources and are not linked in any sense to the official prices used to calculate
the real estate tax (ICI or IMU), which are known to systematically diverge from actual
exchange prices. Different prices are observed by location (generic, central, peripheral),
type of use (residential, commercial or industrial), and bounds (highest price, lowest
price). Real estate prices for Sicily are not available.
Elections This is a dataset on municipal election results collected by the Italian Home Office.
We label "Right-Wing" any coalition containing at least one of the major right-wing
parties (Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, Polo delle Libertà, Il Popolo della Libertà). We
label "Left-Wing" any coalition containing at least one of the major left-wing parties
(Partito Democratico, Democratici di Sinistra). Dubious cases (unidentified party names)
were dropped altogether.
Codes This is a dataset on the city names, codes, and residing population released by ISTAT
(the Italian Office of Statistics). These data were used to obtain a safe merging between
the two previous datasets.
4.2 Selection
The dataset used for estimation contains a collection of municipal election results linked to
real estate prices for the years 2003–2011, for a total of 1,246 observations. Since we focus
exclusively on the right-wing/left-wing voting alternative, we discard a number of cases:
1. In cities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, we drop observations for elections in which
the either the first or the second highest voting mayor is not backed up by a clearly
left-wing or right-wing coalition or party.
2. In cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, we drop observations for First-round elec-
tions in which the either the first or the second highest voting mayor is not backed up
by a clearly left-wing or right-wing coalition or party.
3. In cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, we drop observations for ballots in which
the either the first or the second highest voting mayor is not backed up by a clearly
left-wing or right-wing coalition or party.
Table 1 displays the regional distribution of municipalities with a right-wing party and a
left-wing party majority. There is a higher presence of right-wing party municipalities only in
Lombardia and Veneto.
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Tables 2 and 3 reports the average levels of real estate prices in the municipalities by type
of house and by political party.
Two-sample t tests in table 4 clearly show that municipalities governed by a right-wing
party scantly have statistically significant lower growth rates of real estate prices than munici-
palities governed by a left-wing party, especially after 4 and 5 years from the election.
5 Evaluating the effect of political parties using a regression dis-
continuity design
The evidence reported in Table 2 cannot represent a proper test of the causal effect of political
parties on the average annual growth rate of local real estate prices. An accurate evaluation of
the left-wing party policy effect must contend with problems of isolating the effect of local
public policies from the confounding effect induced by other factors.3
To overcome this problem, we rely on a quasi-experimental design, the Regression Dis-
continuity (RD) design introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960). This approach is
a way of estimating treatment effects in a non-experimental setting where treatment assign-
ment is a discontinuity function of an observed variable at a known threshold value (Lee and
Lemieux, 2010; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Specifically, the RD design estimates local av-
erage impacts around the threshold at the point where treatment and comparison units are
most similar. Thus, the RD design well fits the aim to identify a policy impact by separating
the effect of other factors influencing the outcome under analysis. As discussed above, a large
number of studies have already used a RD design to assess the empirical relevance of median
voter models.
In our case, for the municipality i , ∆ log(Pt0+δ/Pt0) (i.e. the average annual growth rate
of real estate prices) is the outcome variable, yi . The treatment, wi , is the left-wing party
policy action, while the assignment variable, xi , is the fraction awarded to the left-wing party.
When xi exceeds the cut-off of 50%, the municipality is governed by a left-wing coalition.
The presence of a sharp discontinuity in the formation of a majority allows us to implement a
sharp RD design: average left-wing party effects are estimated by comparing the average annual
growth rate of real estate prices of the group of cities with a value of xi just above the threshold
with the average annual growth rate of real estate prices of the group of cities with a value of xi
just below the threshold. We claim that the municipalities with a vote share for the left-wing
party just below the cut-off (50% and just below) will be very similar to municipalities with
a vote share for the left party just above the cut-off (for example, those scoring 51%), except
that they are governed by a right-wing party. Thus, municipalities just below the threshold
can be used as a comparison group for the municipalities just above to estimate the counter-
3For example, spatial hedonic house price models suggest that local real estate prices depend not only on the
characteristics of the houses (size, type, age and other structural characteristics) but also on location characteristics.
For example the Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978)’s hedonic pricing spatial dataset (built at the census tract level)
includes - among spatial level variables - levels of nitrogen oxides, particulate concentrations, black population
proportion, lower status population proportion, crime rate, proportion of area zoned with large lots, proportion
of nonretail business areas, property tax rate, weighted distances to the employment centers, index of accessibility,
and latitude and longitude of the census tract where the house is located.
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factual (what would have happened to the group of cities controlled by the left-wing party if
they were controlled by the right party). We can safely assume that individuals have imprecise
control over x. This is enough to assure that the treatment is as good as randomly assigned
around the cut-off. The local random assignment implies that the discontinuity gap at the
cut-off identifies the treatment effect and that we do not need any control and any model to
consistently detect the effects of left-wing parties on the outcome.
More formally, let yi (1) and yi (0) be the potential outcomes of municipality i with and
without exposure to the treatment, that is the outcomes if wi = 1 and wi = 0, respectively.
Thus, we can write
yi = y1i wi + y0i (1−wi ) (1)
Let τi = y1i − y0i be the treatment effect of municipality i . Rewriting the previous expression
we have
yi = y0i +τi wi (2)
In a sharp RD design the treatment assignment, wi , is a discontinuous deterministic function
of the assignment variable xi :
wi = 1{xi ≥ c} (3)
where c is the cut-off point.
We never observe the pair yi (1) and yi (0) simultaneously. Thus, we focus on averages of
[yi (1)− yi (0)] over sub-samples. Note that conditional on xi = x
E[yi |xi = x] = m(x)+ E[τi wi |xi = x] (4)
where E[y0i |xi = x] = m(x). In a sharp RD design E[wi |xi = x] = P r (wi = 1|xi = x) will
be 0 or 1. Assuming that individuals do not sort into x and, as it is common, that τi = τ,
it follows that E[τi wi |xi = x] = τwi . Dropping the index for convenience and using y =
E[y|x]+ ε, where ε= y − E[y|x], the following expression is obtained
y = m(x)+τw + ε (5)
It is important to remark that, in this case, m(x) is the conditional expectation of the outcome
variable without treatment, y0i , on the selection variable xi = x. But m(x) is defined in the
entire support of xi , so m(x) includes the counter-factual E[y0i |x,w = 1] since E[y0i |x] =
E[y0i |x,w = 0]P r (w = 0|xi = x) + E[y0i |x,w = 1]P r (w = 1|xi = x). In a sharp design the
probabilities will be either 0 or 1.
Equation (5) links the experimental representation of the response variable with an econo-
metric representation, where the assignment variable is smoothly associated with the potential
outcomes. In equation (5), τ is a measure of the discontinuity of the conditional expectation
of the outcome as a function of assignment variable at the threshold value c . It is interpreted
as evidence of a causal effect of the treatment, provided that all other factors affecting yi are
evolving smoothly with respect to x. A sufficient condition for identification of τ is to assume
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continuity of m(x) at c and the existence of the limits limx↑c E[wi |x] and limx↓c E[wi | = x].
In the case of a sharp design, limx↑c E[wi |x] = 0 and limx↓c E[wi |= x] = 1, so as
τSRD = limx↓c E[yi |xi]− limx↑c E[yi |xi] (6)
5.1 A local linear estimator
In practice, the treatment effect !τSRD in an RD design can be consistently computed by es-
timating two local polynomial regression functions on each side of the cut-off point (Hahn,
Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2008). Thus, for example, after having subtracted the threshold
value from the covariate (i.e. after having transformed x to x−c), we can fit local linear regres-
sion functions - such as y = m(x − c)+τw + ε= α+β(x − c)+τw + ε - to the observations
within a distance h (the bandwidth) on either side of the discontinuity point
min
αl ;βl
∑
i :c−h<xi<c
#
yi −αl −βl (xi − c)$2K% xi − xh
&
(7)
and
min
αt ;βt
∑
i :c−h<xi<c
#
yi −αt −βt (xi − c)$2K% xi − xh
&
(8)
whereK(u) is a kernel function which satisfy the two following conditions:
∫
K(u)du = 1 and
K(−u) = K(u) ∀u. Several types of kernel functions can satisfy these conditions: uniform,
triangle, Epanechnikov, quartic (biweight), tricube, triweight, Gaussian, and cosine.
Given these estimates, the average treatment effect is computed as the difference between
the two regressions intercepts on the two sides of the cutoff point:
!τSRD = !αt − !αl (9)
Alternatively, one can estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) running a single pooled
regression on both side of the cutoff point, and thus solving the following minimization prob-
lem:
min
α;β;τ;γ
N∑
i=1
#
yi −α−β(xi − c)−τwi − γ (xi − c)wi$2K% xi − xh
&
(10)
which will numerically yield the same estimate of τSRD . The advantage of estimating the
pooled local linear regression model is that the standard error of !τSRD can be directly obtained
from the regression.
As it is well known, for a correct specification of the local linear regression model the
choice of the kernel function has little impact in practice, while it is very important to choose
an appropriate bandwidth to balance precision and bias: a smaller bandwidth tends to produce
lower bias and higher variance, and vice versa. Two different approaches have been proposed
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to estimate the optimal bandwidth, namely (i) minimizing the sum of squares of some type of
estimated residuals as in cross-validation, generalized cross-validation, and minimum unbiased
risk estimation, and (ii) estimating the asymptotically optimal bandwidth leading to the so
called plug-in estimator. For robustness check, it is customary to estimate the local linear
regression using alternative values of bandwidth, both higher and lower than the optimal one.
5.2 A penalized regression spline estimator
Rau (2011) proposes an alternative nonparametric method for estimating treatment effects in
a RD design using penalized regression spline and generalized cross-validation to choose the
smoothing parameter. He also proposes to exploit the Bayesian interpretation of penalized
regression to obtain the standard errors from the posterior variance-covariance matrix. In a
Monte Carlo simulation study, Rau shows the Bayesian based confidence intervals perform
quite well in terms of realized coverage probabilities and outperforms frequentist based confi-
dence intervals for the local polynomial estimators.
Let us re-write equation (5) as:
y = α+ f (x − c)+τw + ε (11)
The univariate smooth term f (x − c) in equation (11) can be approximated by a linear
combination of known basis functions bq
f (x − c) =∑
q
βq bq (x − c) (12)
where βq are unknown parameters to be estimated. To avoid mis-specification bias, q ′ s must
be made fairly large. But this may generate a danger of over-fitting. As it will be better clarified
below, smoothness of the functions can be controlled by penalizing wiggly functions in the
model fitting. Thus, a measure of ’wiggliness’ J ≡ β′qSβq , where S is a positive semi-definite
matrix, is associated with the smooth function. Typically, the wiggliness measure evaluates a
function like the univariate spline penalty
∫
f ′′(x − c)2d (x − c) or its thin-plate spline gener-
alization (Wood, 2003, 2006a).
Given the bases for the smooth term and ignoring random effect terms, equation (11) can
be re-written in matrix terms as a large linear model
y = α+Σqβq bq (x − c)+τw + ' (13)
= X
′
β+ '
where the model matrix X includes the intercept, the dummy variable w and the basis func-
tions evaluated at the covariate value, while β contains α, τ and all the smooth coefficient
vectors, βq .
As mentioned above, the number of parameters for a smooth term in a semi-parametric
model has to be large enough to avoid mis-specification bias, but not too large to escape over-
fitting. To solve this trade-off, we need to penalize lack of smoothness. Thus, parameters β in
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model (13) can be estimated by minimizing the penalized residual sum of squares!β = argmin‖y −Xβ‖2+λβ′Sβ (14)
where λ ≥ 0 is a smoothing parameter which control the flexibility of the function estimate
with large values enforcing smooth estimates and small values allowing for high flexibility.
Employing a large number of basis functions yields a flexible representation of the nonpara-
metric effect f (·) where the actual degree of smoothness can be adaptively chosen by varying
λ.
Given the smoothing parameter, λ, resulting estimate is!β= (X ′X +λS)−1X ′y (15)
The covariance matrix of !β can be derived from that of y
V !β = (X ′X +λS)−1X ′X (X ′X +λS)−1σ2 (16)
If we also assume normality, that is y ∼* (0, Iσ2), then
!β ∼ * *E * !β+ ,V !β+ (17)
It must be recognized, however, that frequentist confidence intervals based on the naive
use of !β and the corresponding covariance matrix perform quite poorly in terms of realized
coverage probability (Wood, 2006b). Thus, in practice, in additive models based on penal-
ized regression splines frequentist inference yields to reject the null hypothesis too often. To
overcome this problem and following Wahba (1983), Silverman (1985), and Wood (2006a,b),
a Bayesian approach to coefficient uncertainty estimation can be implemented. This strategy
recognizes that, by imposing a particular penalty, we are effectively including some prior be-
liefs about the likely characteristics of the correct model. This can be translated into a Bayesian
framework by specifying a prior distribution for the parametersβ. Specifically, Wood (2006b)
shows that using a Bayesian approach to uncertainty estimation results in a Bayesian posterior
distribution of the parameters
β|y ∼ *
*
E
* !β+ ,(X ′X +λS)−1σ2+ (18)
This latter result can be used directly to calculate credible intervals for any parameter.
Moreover, it turns out (Wahba, 1983; Wood, 2006b) that the credibility intervals derived via
Bayesian theory are well behaved also from a frequentist point of view, i.e. their average
coverage probability is very close to the nominal level 1−α, where α is the significance level.
So far everything is conditional on λ, the smoothing parameters controlling the trade-
off between fidelity to the data and smoothness of the fitted spline. The optimal smoothing
parameter can be selected minimizing the generalized cross validation (GCV) score:
GCV (λ) =
N ‖ y −X !β ‖2
[N − t r (A)]2 (19)
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where A = X (X ′X +∑λS)−1X ′ is the hat matrix for the model being fitted and its trace,
t r (A), gives the effective degrees of freedom ed f (i.e. the number of identifiable parameters
in the model). The ed f are a general measure for the complexity of a fucntion estimates that
allows to compare the smoothness even for different types of effects (e.g. nonparametric versus
parametric effects). If λ=0, then ed f is equal to the size of the β vector minus the number of
constraints. Positive values of λ lead to an effective reduction of the number of parameters. If
λ is high, we have very few ed f .
Finally, like for the local linear estimator, also in the case of the semiparametric additive
model with penalized regression splines it is convenient to introduce the interaction term
f (x − c)w into model (11):
y = α+ f (x − c)+τw + f (x − c)w + ' (20)
and estimate it using the pooled dataset. The nonparametric smooth term f (x − c) in (20)
is the conditional expectation of the outcome variable without treatment (i.e. when w = 0),
while the varying coefficient term f (x − c)τ is the conditional expectation of the outcome
with treatment (i.e. when w = 1). In the case of a varying coefficient term like f (x − c)w, the
basis functions bq (x − c) are pre-multiplied by a diagonal matrix containing the values of the
interaction variable (w). To estimate (20) it is desirable to use the same degree of smoothness
(that the the same smoothing parameter λ) for the two smooth terms.
6 Results
As shown in Table 4, municipalities ruled by a right-wing majority (call by convenience the
treatment group) scantly show a significantly higher growth rate of real estate prices than
municipalities ruled by a right-wing majority (the control group). To properly identify the
treatment effect of political parties on the dynamics of municipalities’ real estate prices, we
have implemented a RD design and in this section we report the estimation results of both
local liner and penalized regression models used to implement the RD design.
First, following the classical sharp RD design, we have estimated two local linear regres-
sion models on both sides of the cut-off, being interesting examine the behaviour around the
threshold. Evidence of a significant jump level at the threshold would mean that the difference
between the right limit and the left limit of the two non-parametric local linear regressions
with respect to the cut-off point is the policy effect in terms of real estate price dynamics. As
it is well known, for a correct specification of the local linear regression model it is very im-
portant to choose an appropriate bandwidth to balance accuracy and bias. We took advantage
of the contribution of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) that present a data dependent method
for choosing an asymptotically optimal bandwidth in the case of a RD design. Local linear re-
gression models have been estimated using a triangular kernel function and bandwidths larger
(twice) and smaller (half) than the optimal bandwidth for test the robustness of the results.
Standard errors are obtained by a bootstrap procedure.
The results are very clear: there is no evidence of a significant left-wing party effect on the
dynamics of real estate prices. To give a graphical example of these results, figure X displays
the two local linear smooth functions estimated (using the optimal bandwidth) for the cases of
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maximum and minimum house price dynamics after 4 years from the election in peripheral
areas. These two plots show that a discontinuity at the cut-off point between treated and
non-treated municipalities, if any, is negligible.
Figure X about here
A more systematic evidence is reported in Tables 5, 6 and 7, which collect the results of 108
local linear regression models. They show that the bootstrap p-value associated to the dif-
ference of the intercepts of the two local linear regressions is never lower than 0.1 (except in
3 out 108 cases), whatever the time lag (3, 4 or 5), the type of land use (residential or com-
mercial/industrial), the bound (highest price or lowest price) and the level of the bandwidth
(optimal, double and half) considered. Finally, the lack of a significant treatment effect is con-
firmed the nonparametric estimates based on a penalized regression estimator (Table 8): the
Bayesian p-value is again always higher than 0.1.
All in all, our findings corroborate the thesis that left-wing and right-wing majorities tend
to implement similar policies, that is they provide similar public and private goods and bads,
with similar net effects on citizens’ welfare.
7 Conclusions
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TABLE 1
Frequencies for the parties in charge
Observations Percentages
Right Left Total Right Left Total
Region
Abruzzo 13 26 39 33.3 66.7 100.0
Basilicata 6 13 19 31.6 68.4 100.0
Calabria 22 24 46 47.8 52.2 100.0
Campania 67 71 138 48.6 51.4 100.0
Emilia-Romagna 12 136 148 8.1 91.9 100.0
Lazio 38 49 87 43.7 56.3 100.0
Liguria 5 15 20 25.0 75.0 100.0
Lombardia 86 80 166 51.8 48.2 100.0
Marche 13 28 41 31.7 68.3 100.0
Molise 0 2 2 0.0 100.0 100.0
Piemonte 32 57 89 36.0 64.0 100.0
Puglia 71 73 144 49.3 50.7 100.0
Sardegna 9 19 28 32.1 67.9 100.0
Toscana 15 158 173 8.7 91.3 100.0
Umbria 8 25 33 24.2 75.8 100.0
Veneto 38 35 73 52.1 47.9 100.0
Total 435 811 1,246 34.9 65.1 100.0
Geographical partition
North West 123 152 275 44.7 55.3 100.0
North East 50 171 221 22.6 77.4 100.0
Center 74 260 334 22.2 77.8 100.0
South 179 209 388 46.1 53.9 100.0
Islands 9 19 28 32.1 67.9 100.0
Total 435 811 1,246 34.9 65.1 100.0
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TABLE 2
Average real estate prices: Housing
Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Region
Abruzzo 958 957 1,060 1,116 1,119 1,161 1,037
Basilicata 829 984 716 724 549 764
Calabria 518 593 796 667 735 601
Campania 1,027 1,183 1,441 1,493 1,273 1,724 1,303
Emilia-Romagna 1,323 1,382 1,725 1,322 1,464 1,115 1,441
Lazio 1,412 1,433 1,620 1,962 1,688 1,711 1,619
Liguria 2,316 1,884 1,955 3,696 2,169 2,250 2,197
Lombardia 1,427 1,475 1,430 1,528 1,364 1,300 1,400
Marche 1,323 1,297 1,412 1,697 1,319 1,548 1,380
Molise 1,076 1,076
Piemonte 1,098 1,114 1,206 1,253 1,253 1,237 1,191
Puglia 658 826 871 964 1,037 958 862
Sardegna 975 957 1,503 1,053 1,180 1,140
Toscana 3,008 1,522 1,835 2,275 1,767 2,166 1,797
Umbria 722 953 1,038 1,068 1,028
Veneto 983 1,129 1,365 1,431 1,126 2,763 1,263
Total 1,054 1,141 1,346 1,496 1,444 1,360 1,313
Geographical partition
North West 1,492 1,340 1,413 1,690 1,357 1,394 1,405
North East 1,096 1,262 1,425 1,407 1,419 1,527 1,383
Center 1,492 1,395 1,627 2,007 1,623 1,806 1,614
South 790 902 1,113 1,160 1,065 1,178 995
Islands 975 957 1,503 1,053 1,180 1,140
Total 1,054 1,141 1,346 1,496 1,444 1,360 1,313
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TABLE 3
Average real estate prices: Store
Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Region
Abruzzo 1,145 1,110 1,184 1,318 1,236 1,520 1,198
Basilicata 820 989 703 715 550 759
Calabria 669 721 1,092 730 884 748
Campania 1,199 1,362 1,562 1,586 1,438 1,939 1,455
Emilia-Romagna 1,490 1,597 1,709 1,710 1,495 1,285 1,507
Lazio 1,586 1,509 1,707 2,130 1,942 1,807 1,751
Liguria 1,973 2,204 1,880 2,756 1,805 1,915 2,035
Lombardia 1,406 1,524 1,484 1,554 1,371 1,405 1,434
Marche 1,310 1,292 1,411 1,738 1,307 1,488 1,373
Molise 1,466 1,466
Piemonte 1,156 1,098 1,239 1,117 1,203 1,199 1,177
Puglia 850 876 981 1,111 1,197 1,125 992
Sardegna 1,073 996 1,367 1,042 1,275 1,175
Toscana 1,639 1,363 1,588 2,124 1,566 1,886 1,590
Umbria 801 1,139 1,046 1,137 1,109
Veneto 858 1,227 1,341 1,427 1,064 3,385 1,302
Total 1,130 1,210 1,379 1,579 1,407 1,463 1,347
Geographical partition
North West 1,430 1,385 1,437 1,587 1,328 1,459 1,401
North East 1,174 1,455 1,408 1,484 1,443 1,810 1,447
Center 1,391 1,396 1,547 2,059 1,503 1,770 1,550
South 978 1,009 1,245 1,302 1,183 1,319 1,130
Islands 1,073 996 1,367 1,042 1,275 1,175
Total 1,130 1,210 1,379 1,579 1,407 1,463 1,347
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TABLE 4
Student’s t test for the difference between groups
Variable: Average annual growth rate of local real estate prices
After 3 years
Type Location Value X¯L σL X¯R σR ∆ p
House Generic min 0.020 0.045 0.013 0.043 0.007 0.054
House Generic max 0.019 0.044 0.016 0.045 0.003 0.274
House Central min 0.018 0.045 0.013 0.044 0.006 0.090
House Central max 0.019 0.045 0.015 0.046 0.005 0.147
House Peripheral min 0.017 0.046 0.010 0.043 0.007 0.068
House Peripheral max 0.016 0.044 0.012 0.044 0.004 0.201
Store Generic min 0.011 0.037 0.006 0.042 0.005 0.094
Store Generic max 0.013 0.039 0.011 0.040 0.002 0.262
Store Central min 0.010 0.037 0.003 0.040 0.007 0.033
Store Central max 0.011 0.038 0.008 0.040 0.003 0.241
Store Peripheral min 0.010 0.046 0.004 0.040 0.006 0.082
Store Peripheral max 0.014 0.045 0.007 0.037 0.006 0.080
After 4 years
Type Location Value X¯L σL X¯R σR ∆ p
House Generic min 0.019 0.044 0.016 0.042 0.003 0.290
House Generic max 0.018 0.043 0.019 0.043 -0.001 0.549
House Central min 0.019 0.045 0.015 0.043 0.004 0.187
House Central max 0.020 0.046 0.017 0.044 0.002 0.303
House Peripheral min 0.017 0.043 0.013 0.040 0.003 0.236
House Peripheral max 0.017 0.043 0.015 0.041 0.002 0.340
Store Generic min 0.011 0.038 0.007 0.038 0.005 0.130
Store Generic max 0.012 0.037 0.012 0.037 0.001 0.425
Store Central min 0.008 0.035 0.004 0.038 0.004 0.129
Store Central max 0.008 0.035 0.010 0.036 -0.001 0.623
Store Peripheral min 0.010 0.044 0.003 0.035 0.007 0.062
Store Peripheral max 0.013 0.043 0.006 0.033 0.007 0.069
After 5 years
Type Location Value X¯L σL X¯R σR ∆ p
House Generic min 0.019 0.039 0.019 0.041 -0.000 0.514
House Generic max 0.017 0.039 0.023 0.042 -0.005 0.827
House Central min 0.019 0.042 0.019 0.042 0.000 0.466
House Central max 0.019 0.042 0.021 0.042 -0.001 0.594
House Peripheral min 0.018 0.039 0.017 0.038 0.001 0.444
House Peripheral max 0.016 0.038 0.019 0.040 -0.003 0.671
Store Generic min 0.011 0.035 0.011 0.035 0.000 0.498
Store Generic max 0.012 0.033 0.013 0.036 -0.002 0.630
Store Central min 0.009 0.032 0.008 0.033 0.000 0.486
Store Central max 0.009 0.031 0.012 0.034 -0.003 0.722
Store Peripheral min 0.011 0.037 0.005 0.028 0.007 0.092
Store Peripheral max 0.013 0.037 0.008 0.032 0.005 0.151
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TABLE 5
Regression discontinuity estimates. Bandwidth =Optimal
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of local real estate prices
After 3 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n bw
House Generic min -0.004 0.013 0.782 427 0.234
House Central min 0.001 0.014 0.939 426 0.217
House Peripheral min 0.004 0.014 0.768 391 0.195
Store Generic min 0.002 0.009 0.798 427 0.342
Store Central min 0.006 0.010 0.546 425 0.244
Store Peripheral min 0.013 0.010 0.222 351 0.334
House Generic max -0.009 0.010 0.353 427 0.374
House Central max -0.006 0.013 0.645 426 0.249
House Peripheral max -0.002 0.013 0.906 391 0.196
Store Generic max -0.007 0.010 0.466 427 0.294
Store Central max 0.001 0.012 0.915 426 0.217
Store Peripheral max 0.002 0.009 0.870 351 0.313
After 4 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n bw
House Generic min -0.021 0.015 0.166 348 0.201
House Central min -0.013 0.015 0.387 348 0.228
House Peripheral min -0.012 0.009 0.177 315 0.412
Store Generic min -0.002 0.012 0.840 348 0.230
Store Central min -0.005 0.011 0.644 347 0.251
Store Peripheral min 0.010 0.009 0.276 283 0.363
House Generic max -0.023 0.014 0.095 348 0.238
House Central max -0.016 0.016 0.297 348 0.230
House Peripheral max -0.012 0.009 0.180 315 0.446
Store Generic max -0.012 0.014 0.381 348 0.202
Store Central max -0.015 0.012 0.213 347 0.238
Store Peripheral max -0.001 0.009 0.907 283 0.283
After 5 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n bw
House Generic min -0.019 0.016 0.231 228 0.203
House Central min -0.011 0.016 0.507 228 0.216
House Peripheral min -0.002 0.010 0.830 199 0.378
Store Generic min -0.001 0.014 0.948 228 0.190
Store Central min -0.001 0.012 0.933 227 0.264
Store Peripheral min 0.020 0.011 0.054 176 0.170
House Generic max -0.021 0.016 0.188 228 0.207
House Central max -0.017 0.017 0.318 228 0.202
House Peripheral max 0.007 0.015 0.651 199 0.158
Store Generic max -0.002 0.013 0.858 228 0.228
Store Central max -0.003 0.010 0.793 227 0.391
Store Peripheral max 0.011 0.010 0.310 176 0.183
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TABLE 6
Regression discontinuity estimates. Bandwidth =Half
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of local real estate prices
After 3 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n bw
House Generic min -0.009 0.018 0.626 427 0.234
House Central min 0.003 0.019 0.868 426 0.217
House Peripheral min 0.009 0.021 0.692 391 0.195
Store Generic min 0.004 0.013 0.749 427 0.342
Store Central min 0.015 0.014 0.264 425 0.244
Store Peripheral min 0.018 0.014 0.209 351 0.334
House Generic max -0.011 0.014 0.423 427 0.374
House Central max -0.003 0.019 0.866 426 0.249
House Peripheral max 0.003 0.020 0.879 391 0.196
Store Generic max -0.008 0.013 0.551 427 0.294
Store Central max 0.012 0.016 0.445 426 0.217
Store Peripheral max 0.003 0.014 0.847 351 0.313
After 4 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n bw
House Generic min -0.021 0.020 0.293 348 0.201
House Central min -0.010 0.020 0.606 348 0.228
House Peripheral min -0.009 0.013 0.470 315 0.412
Store Generic min 0.001 0.016 0.971 348 0.230
Store Central min -0.002 0.015 0.893 347 0.251
Store Peripheral min 0.017 0.012 0.140 283 0.363
House Generic max -0.025 0.019 0.201 348 0.238
House Central max -0.011 0.022 0.604 348 0.230
House Peripheral max -0.007 0.013 0.584 315 0.446
Store Generic max -0.008 0.018 0.658 348 0.202
Store Central max -0.008 0.016 0.610 347 0.238
Store Peripheral max -0.000 0.011 0.975 283 0.283
After 5 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n bw
House Generic min -0.016 0.022 0.470 228 0.203
House Central min -0.007 0.022 0.744 228 0.216
House Peripheral min 0.004 0.013 0.737 199 0.378
Store Generic min 0.003 0.018 0.883 228 0.190
Store Central min -0.001 0.015 0.941 227 0.264
Store Peripheral min 0.021 0.012 0.069 176 0.170
House Generic max -0.017 0.021 0.427 228 0.207
House Central max -0.006 0.023 0.810 228 0.202
House Peripheral max 0.013 0.023 0.559 199 0.158
Store Generic max -0.001 0.018 0.948 228 0.228
Store Central max -0.005 0.014 0.705 227 0.391
Store Peripheral max 0.011 0.012 0.351 176 0.183
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TABLE 7
Regression discontinuity estimates. Bandwidth = Double
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of local real estate prices
After 3 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n bw
House Generic min 0.000 0.009 0.973 427 0.234
House Central min 0.004 0.010 0.665 426 0.217
House Peripheral min 0.001 0.010 0.917 391 0.195
Store Generic min 0.002 0.007 0.814 427 0.342
Store Central min 0.007 0.007 0.348 425 0.244
Store Peripheral min 0.007 0.008 0.387 351 0.334
House Generic max -0.008 0.008 0.368 427 0.374
House Central max -0.000 0.010 0.979 426 0.249
House Peripheral max -0.005 0.009 0.561 391 0.196
Store Generic max -0.004 0.007 0.619 427 0.294
Store Central max -0.000 0.008 0.964 426 0.217
Store Peripheral max 0.001 0.008 0.880 351 0.313
After 4 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n bw
House Generic min -0.015 0.011 0.149 348 0.201
House Central min -0.007 0.010 0.533 348 0.228
House Peripheral min -0.011 0.008 0.177 315 0.412
Store Generic min -0.000 0.009 0.993 348 0.230
Store Central min -0.001 0.008 0.908 347 0.251
Store Peripheral min 0.006 0.008 0.480 283 0.363
House Generic max -0.018 0.010 0.080 348 0.238
House Central max -0.010 0.011 0.368 348 0.230
House Peripheral max -0.013 0.008 0.137 315 0.446
Store Generic max -0.006 0.009 0.553 348 0.202
Store Central max -0.010 0.008 0.226 347 0.238
Store Peripheral max -0.001 0.007 0.940 283 0.283
After 5 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n bw
House Generic min -0.013 0.011 0.245 228 0.203
House Central min -0.004 0.012 0.724 228 0.216
House Peripheral min -0.007 0.009 0.440 199 0.378
Store Generic min 0.003 0.010 0.802 228 0.190
Store Central min 0.002 0.009 0.820 227 0.264
Store Peripheral min 0.014 0.009 0.107 176 0.170
House Generic max -0.016 0.011 0.157 228 0.207
House Central max -0.009 0.012 0.439 228 0.202
House Peripheral max -0.003 0.011 0.815 199 0.158
Store Generic max -0.000 0.010 0.999 228 0.228
Store Central max -0.004 0.009 0.626 227 0.391
Store Peripheral max 0.008 0.008 0.310 176 0.183
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TABLE 8
Penalized regression spline estimator
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of local real estate prices
The effect of a left-wing majority on real estate prices after 3 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n
House Generic min 0.006 0.013 0.650 452
House Generic max -0.002 0.012 0.879 452
House Central min 0.008 0.015 0.582 452
House Central max 0.003 0.014 0.839 452
House Peripheral min -0.001 0.007 0.920 410
House Peripheral max -0.006 0.007 0.429 410
Store Generic min 0.007 0.013 0.612 452
Store Generic max 0.001 0.012 0.932 452
Store Central min 0.010 0.015 0.500 451
Store Central max 0.003 0.014 0.801 451
Store Peripheral min 0.004 0.007 0.616 369
Store Peripheral max -0.001 0.007 0.893 369
The effect of a left-wing majority on real estate prices after 4 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n
House Generic min -0.002 0.008 0.791 371
House Generic max -0.006 0.008 0.444 371
House Central min 0.001 0.010 0.940 371
House Central max -0.004 0.008 0.639 371
House Peripheral min -0.006 0.011 0.602 332
House Peripheral max -0.006 0.009 0.537 332
Store Generic min 0.005 0.011 0.655 371
Store Generic max 0.001 0.010 0.913 371
Store Central min 0.005 0.011 0.630 370
Store Central max -0.002 0.011 0.844 370
Store Peripheral min 0.009 0.007 0.225 299
Store Peripheral max 0.004 0.007 0.554 299
The effect of a left-wing majority on real estate prices after 5 years
Type Location Value β se p-value n
House Generic min -0.014 0.025 0.568 248
House Generic max -0.010 0.009 0.254 248
House Central min -0.000 0.012 0.982 248
House Central max -0.004 0.009 0.637 248
House Peripheral min -0.007 0.011 0.516 213
House Peripheral max -0.010 0.009 0.259 213
Store Generic min 0.004 0.013 0.740 248
Store Generic max 0.003 0.012 0.825 248
Store Central min 0.003 0.019 0.877 247
Store Central max -0.000 0.014 0.974 247
Store Peripheral min 0.008 0.008 0.334 189
Store Peripheral max 0.003 0.009 0.693 189
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TABLE 9
Self-metaregression
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of local real estate prices
House Store Both
β p-value β p-value β p-value
Estimated treatment -0.0003 (0.973) -0.0071 (0.325) -0.0038 (0.494)
Central location 0.0069 (0.124) 0.0008 (0.811) 0.0038 (0.171)
Peripheral location 0.0075 (0.065) 0.0094 (0.008) 0.0084 (0.002)
Dummy for maximum price 0.0031 (0.365) 0.0076 (0.008) 0.0055 (0.012)
Time horizon -0.0036 (0.102) 0.0004 (0.817) -0.0014 (0.312)
Observations 54 54 108
Prob > F 0.150 0.005 0.002
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